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Whose Voice?  
Transnational CSOs and their relations with members,  
supporters and beneficiaries 
ABSTRACT 
It is often claimed that the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) can miti-
gate the ‘democratic deficit’ of international organisations and the European Union. The 
underlying assumption is that transnational CSOs are, through their advocacy work, 
voicing citizens’ interests, anxieties, hopes and ideals. In this paper we report the first 
results of an empirical research project in which we investigated if, and in what precise 
way, transnational CSOs are actually reaching out to citizens. In our interviews with 
officials from 60 transnational CSOs we found that, in most cases, communication be-
tween the CSO offices and members is dense when discussing strategic decisions. How-
ever, in tactical matters CSO officials seem to rely more on consultation with peers, and 
the international secretariats often act autonomously. We were also able to identify two 
prevailing models of consultation in transnational CSOs. First, there is a ‘formal and 
federal model’ of consultation that features representative bodies in which sub-units are 
represented. The second is an ‘informal participatory model’, which contains a great 
deal of ad hoc communication between the office and interested individuals. From the 
point of view of democratic theory, both models have specific advantages and, thus, it 
cannot be said that one is generally preferable. Within each category, however, there are 
CSOs that perform better than others. 
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Whose Voice?  
Transnational CSOs and their relations with members,  
supporters and beneficiaries 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the scholarly debate on European and global governance, it is often claimed that the 
participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) can mitigate the ‘democratic deficit’ 
of international organisations (IOs) and the European Union (EU). CSO participation, it 
is argued, will promote political plurality, enhance accountability and give voice to citi-
zens’ concerns that would otherwise be ignored by government representatives. A key 
assumption underlying these theory-driven accounts is that transnational CSOs formu-
late and ‘represent’ citizens’ interests, anxieties, hopes and ideals through their advo-
cacy work. Any democratisation of international politics through CSO involvement 
therefore seems to depend upon the capacity and willingness of these organisations to 
take up the concerns of citizens and voice them in the political arena. This may be 
called the ‘transmission belt thesis’ – the idea that transnational CSOs should function 
as communicative interfaces that link a global citizenry with IOs (Steffek and Nanz 
2008: 8).  
If such a transmission belt is actually functioning is a subject of much controversy. 
Many advocates of civil society involvement in international politics seem to believe 
that transnational CSOs are indeed connecting IOs with citizens worldwide (Esty 2002). 
Many authors who perceive civil society participation to have a democratising potential 
also assume that CSOs voice the arguments of a considerable number of citizens. Most 
critics of civil society involvement, by contrast, vigorously deny this democratising po-
tential (Anderson 2000; Johns 2003; Trachtman and Moremen 2003). In their view, 
transnational CSOs are, in reality, a jet-setting elite group that furthers its own interests 
and/or cultivates its pet issues without much interest in what ‘the people on the ground’ 
really think. Which of the two contrasting views is correct?  
Unfortunately, so far there has been little academic research to empirically answer 
this question. There is, of course, an enormous amount of excellent literature available 
on transnational CSOs and advocacy networks. However, much of this work is inter-
ested mainly in the political role and importance of non-state actors vis-à-vis states and 
IOs. The literature focuses on political strategies and tactics, with the aim of discovering 
the determinants of success in world politics (e.g. Arts 1998: 55-61; Keck and Sikkink 
1998: 25-29; Reinalda et al. 2001; Risse 2002: 262-268). Other authors are chiefly in-
terested in the cooperation between IOs and CSOs and ask why, or under what condi-
tions, such partnerships emerge (Bouwen 2002; Martens 2005; Reimann 2006). There is 
considerably less literature discussing the internal functioning of transnational CSOs, 
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especially the interaction of their leadership with members, supporters, and those indi-
viduals affected by their work. Research that focuses on citizens has been mainly inter-
ested in transnational social movements and protest (Tarrow 2005). The question of 
how CSOs, as fairly professionalised organisations, reach out to their constituencies has 
been addressed in the national and local context (Guo and Musso 2007), but much less 
so with regard to transnational organisations. The relationship between transnational 
CSOs and their constituency of members, supporters, and beneficiaries has thus far re-
mained an understudied issue. In fact, it is only in relation to the EU that we have found 
an interview-based study on nine development-focused NGOs (Warleigh 2001) and, in 
a different article based on Warleigh’s framework for analysis, a study of NGOs in the 
drafting process of the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance (Sudbery 
2003). 
In this paper, we present the first results of a much broader empirical research project 
in which we investigated if transnational CSOs are actually able to function as a trans-
mission belt between international governance institutions and the transnational citi-
zenry. Do the CSOs reach out to citizens, listen and then voice their concerns in interna-
tional political forums? As we will explain in more detail below, when we say citizens 
we do not mean ‘everyone’. CSOs, by their very nature, can only represent a certain 
faction of the citizenry. The citizens that CSOs should be expected to directly reach out 
to can be only their formal members, their supporters, or the beneficiaries of their work. 
In our research project, we apply a set of four criteria to evaluate the internal organisa-
tional structures of CSOs and their relations with the mentioned groups of citizens (for a 
theoretical justification of these criteria, see Steffek et al. 2010): possibilities of partici-
pation (of members, supporters, beneficiaries); transparency of the organisation (inter-
nal and external); inclusion of disadvantaged groups (in the sense of empowerment); 
and independence (from the state and IOs, to avoid distortion of political programmes). 
These four criteria were operationalised for empirical research through a questionnaire 
containing 54 questions. These questions were used to guide semi-structured interviews 
with representatives of 60 transnationally active CSOs involved in political advocacy at 
the EU institutions in Brussels, and at international organisations based in Geneva.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into eight sections. In the next section we pro-
vide definitions of key terms, such as ‘civil society organisation’, and briefly introduce 
the theoretical approach from which the transmission belt model emerged. Against the 
backdrop of this normative model we develop and explain the four criteria utilised in 
this comparative study to assess the extent to which transnational CSOs may represent 
the citizens’ voice. In section three we present the methodology of this research and the 
case selection. Section four investigates the self-perception of transnational CSO and 
their relation with members. Section five through eight report the major results of our 
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empirical investigation, divided along the lines of our four criteria. The concluding sec-
tion, number nine, puts the results into theoretical perspective, developing two organisa-
tional models of CSO outreach to their constituencies.  
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CRITERIA 
The theoretical starting point of our research is the claim that CSOs may be able to con-
tribute to a democratisation of international governance. This idea is very popular in the 
recent literature on international politics and European integration. The underlying con-
ception of democracy varies: some authors adopt a pluralist reasoning, highlighting that 
the presence of CSOs will lead to a more balanced representation of societal groups and 
interests in the policy process (Greenwood 2007); others relate to a deliberative concep-
tion of democracy, stressing argumentative rationality, public debate, and learning ef-
fects that may result from the consultation of civil society actors (de Schutter 2002; 
Nanz and Steffek 2004). The conjecture in both cases is that CSOs may help link inter-
national governance institutions with the global citizenry by transmitting the interests, 
anxieties, hopes and ideals of citizens to IOs, and to subsequently feed them into their 
policy processes. As political arguments are not floating freely, but are actually situated 
in the life world and experiences of citizens, it is necessary from both a normative and a 
functional point of view that transnational CSOs remain in close contact with the citi-
zenry. In this respect, even a deliberative conception of democracy cannot avoid ques-
tions of participation and representation. The purpose of our research is to investigate 
empirically to what extent transnational CSOs are able to function as transmission belts. 
This section develops the set of criteria that we used to operationalise the concept of a 
‘transmission belt’ for our empirical research. 
The term ‘civil society organisation’ is fuzzy and contested, with its meaning chang-
ing over time (Jensen 2006; Jobert and Kohler-Koch 2008). It has empirical referents, 
but also strong normative connotations, at least in the sense of the ‘civility’ of such ac-
tors. Authors who seek to avoid such normative connotations are often speaking of ‘in-
terest groups’, rather than CSOs. Still others prefer the term non-governmental organi-
sation (NGO), which is widely used in the context of international governance and law 
(Martens 2003). The disadvantage of using the term ‘interest groups’ is that it evokes a 
strong association with the rational pursuit of a given group’s self-interest. Many of the 
non-state actors encountered in international politics are advancing interest that they 
frame as public and that have beneficiaries beyond the group of activists, such as the 
poor, the disabled, the marginalised, or even future generations. The term ‘interest 
group’, although perfectly adequate to describe transnational business and professional 
associations, would be a bit misleading in the context of such charitable work. Not least 
for that reason, non-profit organisations that pursue advocacy for others, or in the name 
of the common good, are often labelled NGOs, rather than interest groups. That term in 
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its conventional definition excludes trade unions, professional associations and employ-
ers’ associations, as well as religious congregations. However, all of those actors are 
prominently engaged in international politics. For these reasons, we prefer the term 
‘civil society organisation’, which we use in a very broad sense to cover the sample of 
non-state actors we are studying.1 CSO is meant to denote a non-governmental, non-
profit organisation that has a clearly stated purpose, legal personality, and pursues its 
goals through political advocacy and in non-violent ways. In addition to activist organi-
sations this definition includes the social partners (i.e. international federations of trade 
unions and employers associations), consumer associations, charities, and religious 
communities. Given our focus on internationalised policy-making, all CSOs in our sam-
ple are transnationally active. This means either that CSOs are pursuing their political 
activities simultaneously in several countries, or that they target IOs in their home coun-
try whose range of policy-making is, by definition, international. 
The focus of our project is on the methods utilised by CSOs to reach out to their con-
stituency. In practice, these constituents might be their members, supporters, or benefi-
ciaries. Members of a CSO have an official affiliation and usually pay membership fees. 
Supporters are those who voluntarily offer services, ideas or funding to a CSO without 
attaining official member status. We define as beneficiaries those individuals whose life 
chances a given CSO seeks to improve through its advocacy and service provision, 
and/or for whom the CSO claims to speak. Despite the positive connotation of the word 
‘beneficiary’, there is no guarantee that these individuals eventually benefit from the 
activity of the CSO. Below, we suggest a list of four criteria to assess the degree to 
which a transnational CSO is able to successfully reach out to its members, supporters 
and beneficiaries: 
(1) participation 
(2) inclusion 
(3) transparency 
(4) independence 
The first, and most central, criterion is participation. The presumption of our research is 
that transnational CSOs need to reach out, regardless of means and procedures, to mem-
bers, supporters, and beneficiaries in order to fulfil their democratising function.2 The 
                                                 
1  Not all scholars would agree that he term ‘civil society organisation’ can be used in such a broad sense. As Koh-
ler-Koch and Quittkat (2008) have found in a survey, academic specialists disagree if one should include business 
associations, professional associations and trade unions under the CSO heading. 
2  It should be noted at this point that not all perspectives share the view that CSOs must be internally democratic in 
this way to have democratic effect. From a strictly pluralist perspective, for example, CSOs do not need to meet 
this requirement. In line with this view, a proposed law to regulate the inner organisational structures of associa-
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aim of this exercise is to establish a communicative process by which the decision-
makers in CSOs learn about the concerns and interests of their societal constituency. 
Participation, thus, refers to practices through which the members, supporters, and bene-
ficiaries of a CSO are involved in the internal decision-making process of the organisa-
tion. In practice, participation might be organised in very different ways. Members usu-
ally have the formal right to elect the CSO board and sometimes directly make deci-
sions at the strategic level. While voting rights are justly limited to formal members, 
supporters should also be consulted in the decision-making process. Supporters who 
donate money and volunteer services to the CSO, which may be more than what the 
members contribute, should have a right to be heard. As the beneficiaries are heavily 
affected by the activities of the CSO, they too should have a chance to get their voices 
and opinions heard in the process of decision making. By allowing the individuals af-
fected by its advocacy work participate in its internal decision-making processes and 
external activities, a CSO can ensure that its activities and lobbying efforts are in line 
with the needs of its constituents.  
Formal opportunities for participation do not automatically ensure that all those af-
fected by a CSO’s work can participate on equal grounds. Schattschneider (1960: 35) 
already noted the discrepancy between the ideal and the practice of egalitarian access to 
societal interest groups: “[T]he flaw in pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings 
with an upper class accent.” Formal rules and procedures are probably a good first indi-
cator for the energy a CSO has put into trying to enhance the participation by members, 
supporters and/or beneficiaries. However, not all those who participate are equally able 
to speak the language of professional policy makers, nor do all have the same social 
capital and social networks with which to empower their arguments. Given this discrep-
ancy, we supplement the criterion of participation with the criterion of inclusion. 
The principle of Inclusion means, to us, that CSOs should undertake empowering ac-
tivities towards potentially disadvantaged groups among their members, supporters and 
beneficiaries. We do not expect CSOs to empower all possibly disadvantaged address-
ees of global or European governance but only those within their own constituency. 
Disadvantaged groups and individuals may be those coming from underdeveloped re-
gions of the world or marginalised groups in an otherwise affluent society (e.g. mi-
                                                                                                                                               
tions was rejected in Germany in the 1970s. It was perceived to lead to a “juridification of the remaining plural-
istic leeway in the political system” (von Alemann and Heinze 1981:117, translation by author), but the law, 
which had been promoted by both liberal and conservative forces, was also not approved because it seemed to be 
targeted one-sidedly at weakening trade unions (Offe 1981). We do not share the view that “exit” is sufficient as a 
mechanism for CSO members to express discontent. Members, supporters, and beneficiaries should be able to ac-
tively participate in the respective organisation.  
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grants, those who are illiterate, individuals with handicaps, etc.). Possible empowerment 
activities could include: special funding for representatives of disadvantaged groups 
(such as travel grants), affirmative action, capacity building, and the provision of tech-
nical assistance. Such empowerment activities are a precondition for effective participa-
tion by disadvantaged persons. The two criteria can be distinguished neatly from one 
another, as inclusion requires the empowerment of certain persons in order to enable 
them to voice their political concerns; whereas, participation requires that these indi-
viduals are in fact consulted. 
Our third criterion, Transparency, is almost universally considered to be a necessary 
element of good governance (Bovens 2007: 449). Transparency may be defined as 
“easy access to accurate and comprehensible information about policy decisions and 
decision-making processes” (Naurin 2002: 9; see also Nanz and Steffek 2005: 375). 
Only by knowing what organisations do and how they do it can chains of accountability 
be constructed (Grigorescu 2007: 626). The issue of transparency has gained more im-
portance as IOs have extended their activity to virtually all areas of governance. Trans-
parency is also a precondition for receiving the adequate input at the right point in time, 
thereby making participation and inclusion meaningful, in addition to allowing the 
transmission belt to work.  
In principle, the concept of transparency means being open and providing informa-
tion to the general public. How could such a demand be operationalised for empirical 
research? The key measure is the extent of transparency, namely the extent to which 
they publish anything their constituents might be interested in, as there are numerous 
types of information to be made public. One transparency demand that CSOs, and other 
organisations, experience concerns information on the way they reach decisions (An-
heier and Themudo 2005: 195). CSO should make it public in an accessible and com-
prehensible manner through which decision-making procedures they form their posi-
tions. This can be most easily achieved by publishing their statutes, by-laws or memo-
randa of association. Contributions to the budget of a CSO ought to be transparent, too. 
Ideally, information on the budget should specify its size and its origin in detail in order 
to allow the interested publics to assess its independence from government or compa-
nies. Making expenditures public is necessary for financial accountability, but also en-
ables the observer to identify organisational priorities through the appropriation of funds 
for specific budget lines. Finally, we consider it beneficial to transparency if a CSO is 
regularly evaluating its own activities, in particular if the evaluation is performed by 
external agencies or consultants, and if the results are made public. 
Our fourth indicator is independence. As it is generally assumed that civil society is 
separate from the state and the market (Anheier et al. 2001: 17), the independence of 
CSOs from both of them represents an interesting question for empirical research. For 
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our study it is particularly interesting, as CSOs are assigned a specific role in democra-
tising international governance. If CSOs are to have a role as transmission belts of citi-
zens’ interests and concerns, those citizens need to be ensured that the CSOs are free 
and unconstrained in their expression of interests and arguments. If the independence of 
a CSO is jeopardised, it would be prevented from exercising its function as intermediary 
between citizens and the sites of policy-making. On closer inspection, the criterion of 
CSO independence has two, often interlinked, dimensions: organisational and financial 
independence. There are different circumstances which can pose a threat to the political 
independence of a CSO. The organisational independence is endangered if the founder 
of the CSO is the state, an intergovernmental institution, or a single profit-making cor-
poration (see Martens 2001 for the creation of NGOs by UNESCO). The same is true if 
a CSO’s staff is seconded from, or financed by, political institutions or commercial en-
terprises.  
Organisational and financial independence, rather obviously, go hand in hand and the 
former can be measured to a certain extent by the latter (Martens 2001). As non-profit 
organisations, most CSOs depend, at least to some degree, on financial support from the 
outside. However, if they receive a large amount of funding from government agencies 
or a single private company, they might run the risk of becoming co-opted (Bichsel 
1996: 236-238; Hirsch 2003: 9). Consequences of co-optation may be that political or 
business actors utilise CSOs for their own purposes; that CSOs avoid criticism of the 
state, IOs or company that provides funding; or that their programs and projects reflect 
donor views rather than the needs of either their beneficiaries or the preferences of their 
own members. We are aware that relations of organisational and financial dependence 
are only indicators of a propensity for co-optation rather than proof that it occurs. For 
example, while in some countries government-funded organisations may indeed be gov-
ernment-driven, in others governments do not expect favours or conformity in return for 
funding (Bichsel 1996: 237). Nevertheless, our indicators of independence allow us to 
assess the probability that co-optation might become an issue for a transnational CSO. 
3 CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH STRATEGY 
3.1 Case Selection  
To reiterate, the purpose of our study is to obtain an overview of the internal function-
ing of transnational CSOs across policy fields. Unlike EU studies that normally focus 
exclusively on the Brussels community of CSOs, we set out to compare them to glob-
ally active organisations that are working with the United Nations system and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). With these considerations in mind, we decided to study 
four policy-fields in which CSOs are typically active at both the European and global 
level: environmental protection, human rights protection, trade, and peace. We took 
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European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), EU Migration policy, EU Environment 
policy, EU External Trade policy, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the WTO, and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as 
institutional focal points around which various CSO activities might revolve. We did 
not select our CSOs for study according to theory-driven criteria, in the sense of picking 
least likely cases or most likely cases. We initially remained agnostic as to what organ-
isational characteristics of a CSO would make successful outreach to citizens more or 
less likely.  
Our first consideration in case selection was to choose civil society actors that were 
regularly active in their respective policy field. This could not be taken for granted, as 
official registers are full of CSOs that appear only occasionally at their respective meet-
ings and, in some cases, appeared only once. Our second consideration was to analyse 
only those CSOs that have a certain amount of political influence. Questions of legiti-
macy of CSOs have arisen over the last few years precisely because their political influ-
ence has become ever more visible. In order to assess the activities and importance of 
CSOs in their respective policy-fields we scrutinised the lists of participants distributed 
before and during important events (for example, sessions of the UN Human Rights 
Council). We investigated which CSOs participated most often (and were present at 
most sessions of a negotiation series, for example), which were well-represented (in 
numbers of officials present), and which were most active in terms of delivering written 
statements. In addition, secondary literature on CSO activity in their respective policy-
field provided information on which CSOs to choose for interview. During our field 
work we controlled for the validity of our own selection by asking CSO representatives 
for their own assessment of which groups were most important/influential in the given 
policy-field or negotiation series. In this way, we complemented our initial list of CSOs. 
The selection of CSOs for study, of course, also depended on their availability for inter-
view, which in practice proved to be a major restraint. 
In the end we obtained a sample of 60 transnational CSOs available for study that are 
politically most active and are considered, by us and their own peers, as being influen-
tial. A look at the sample (Annex 1) shows that it includes general interest NGOs as 
well as special interest groups, such as trade unions and employers’ organisations. 
Given our focus on outreach to citizens, one interesting characteristic became immedi-
ately obvious: many of the most active and influential CSOs are ‘umbrella organisa-
tions,’ which means that their constituency exists of other civil society groups, not di-
rectly by individuals. 35 of our 60 cases fall into this category. In these cases the envis-
aged transmission belt would have to bridge several organisational sections before it 
reaches the citizen. Our sample also contains ‘hybrid’ cases of organisations that have 
both individual and organisational members. PICUM, for example, is an organisation 
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active in EU migration policy and offers membership to individuals interested in migra-
tion issues, in addition to refugee organisations. Another special case is transnational 
religious groups, such as Franciscans International or the Quakers, whose members are 
individuals who also form national or regional groups. 
3.2 Research strategy 
As a first step, we collected all information on the respective CSOs that is publicly 
available in either printed form or, in most cases, on the Internet. In particular, we were 
interested in their statutes and bylaws, budgetary information, reports, and products of 
their advocacy. We also searched for codes of conduct to which they adhere, in addition 
to the results of external evaluations. The results of this search were already useful for 
our assessment of external transparency of a CSO. Subsequently, these results were 
complemented by interviews with CSO officials. Our interview partners were either in 
charge of external relations of a CSO, usually in large professionalised organisations, or 
policy officers responsible for advocacy work in Brussels and/or Geneva. Most inter-
views with CSO representatives were conducted face-to-face, although   some were 
conducted by telephone, between spring 2007 and fall 2008. The interviews lasted on 
average one hour, were tape-recorded and fully transcribed. All interviews were con-
ducted following the same set of 54 questions, which were included in our interview 
guideline. While some questions asked for general information about the CSO (for ex-
ample, “How many members does your organisation have?”), most gathered informa-
tion relevant for assessing the CSOs in reference to our criteria. We were careful to 
avoid encouraging socially desirable answers by avoiding normatively charged wording 
and by spreading questions on key issues (such as member participation) across the in-
terview. 15 questions came with a set of possible answers (‘multiple choice’), while 39 
questions were open. In most cases, the combination of different answers was possible 
so that in the following sections (also for the multiple choice-questions), the total num-
ber of answers typically do not add up to 60 (whether several answers were combined is 
indicated in the footnotes). In addition, not all of our interviewees answered all of the 54 
questions – the information on how many interviewees did not answer a specific ques-
tion is also included in the footnotes. 
4 HOW TRANSNATIONAL CSOS SEE THEMSELVES (AND THEIR MEMBERS) 
In our interviews we first explored the organization’s perception of the role and impor-
tance of its constituents. The first, admittedly rough, indicator is a name. What do CSO 
officials call the individuals that constitute their organisations?3  28 CSOs refer to them 
as members and eight as supporters. Others prefer terms indicating a horizontal working 
                                                 
3  Some interviewees wished to combine answers. 
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relationship, such as colleagues (8), friends (4), partners or collaborators. Whereas six 
referred exclusively to terms describing employment relations (such as ‘staff’, ‘employ-
ees’, or ‘interns’), indicating that they do not perceive a broad societal base, but instead 
are a group of professionals speaking for themselves. Ten interviewees pointed out that 
they deal mainly or exclusively with representatives of member organisations and not 
directly with individual members. As they nevertheless call these representatives their 
members, we need to caution that, in the following discussion, some ‘members’ may be 
representing a lower level of the organisation, like national chapters or other affiliated 
groups. Although we are focusing on the ‘downward’ dimension of communication in 
transnational CSOs, it is not implied that communication arrives directly ‘on the 
ground’. 
When asked for whom the organisations actually claim to speak, most CSO officials 
say that they speak for their members: 35 CSO officials gave this answer. These mem-
bers include individual members and member organisations, some of which are um-
brella organisations themselves. 18 organisations mentioned that they primarily speak 
for their beneficiaries; while six CSO officials answered that they speak for both 
groups, members and beneficiaries. Among those who claim to speak for their benefici-
aries, SFCG and Saferworld said that they speak on behalf of people/communities af-
fected by conflict; whereas, Human Rights Watch indicated that they speak for victims 
of human rights abuse. Many CSO officials, however, were careful not to say that they 
actually ‘speak for’ these individuals, or on their behalf; they chose wordings such as 
“we try to ensure that voices from the ground are heard by policy and decision makers” 
(International Alert), or said that they work “side by side with movements and organisa-
tions of poor people” (Action Aid). In this context, the interviewee from Friends of the 
Earth pointed out: “We work very closely with partners, with allies, for instance, in 
indigenous groups and communities. So, in a way, we also represent their voices in our 
campaigns. And we have series of strategic allies that we work with in the farmers’ 
movement, in the indigenous people movement. We do not speak on their behalf, but 
work with them closely”. This quote exemplifies a quite common ambivalence: on the 
one hand, many CSOs want to represent the voices of their beneficiaries; on the other 
hand they are well aware that this may involve the risk of being paternalistic. Besides 
their members and beneficiaries, seven CSOs answered that they speak for general pur-
poses, such as the environment (BUND), nature (WWF), mankind in general (CIMADE), 
human rights (Amnesty International), or the NGO community (CONGO). The CSOs 
which claim to speak for a general purpose may also claim to speak for their members: 
“We speak for human rights – we only speak for our members insofar as they consider 
human rights as the central concern of our association […]” (Interviewee Amnesty In-
ternational, translation by authors).  
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Interestingly, only two organisations stated that they speak on behalf of citizens or 
civil society more generally: Germanwatch said that they were “representatives of civil 
society and a lobby for the weak […] a voice for Southern countries, countries that are 
not so strong”, while ECAS said that they speak for “citizens in general”. Only one 
CSO, FES, indicated that they speak for their donors. While most interviewees claimed 
to be speaking for a specific group of persons and/or a wider purpose, the Crisis Man-
agement Initiative indicated that they speak on the basis of their expertise rather than on 
the base of their members’ views. The interviewee from the International Crisis Group 
answered that they speak on behalf of what they think were the “facts on the ground”, 
whereas another organisation named itself a “think tank” and a “monitor for citizens”. 
While the representative of Pax Christi said that they speak for and in the name of the 
organisation, the representative of GLOCOM said the organisation generally speaks “for 
itself”. Finally, ICTSD said that they speak “for nobody”4.  
When asked for what purpose members are involved in the organisation (multiple 
answers possible), the most common answer, given 36 times, was that members con-
tribute to policy development and provide input to the CSO. This input by the CSO’s 
members is very important for some of the organisations. QCEA, for example, indicates 
that their members make the important policy decisions, while the Alliance Sud said that 
their members formulate the policy goals. The CSO officers we interviewed also high-
lighted their members’ involvement in project implementation and campaigning (22 
answers) and fundraising (24 answers). Many CSO officers also referred to their mem-
bers as helping to provide services to the general public (14 answers). Twelve CSOs 
indicated that their members were engaged in an evaluation of the CSO’s activities. The 
interviewee from WIDE, for example, mentioned that the organisation has an external 
evaluation of their activities and that the members are invited to contribute to it. An-
other answer given by seven CSOs was that their members were directly involved in 
advocacy.  
Some CSOs highlighted their members’ pivotal function at the national level, be it 
through participation in national debates (IHEU), through advocacy at the national level 
(for example, FTA), or through their national and local work with beneficiaries 
(CCME)5. In this context, a certain task-sharing becomes visible between the CSO ad-
vocacy office that concentrates on lobbying at the international organisation on the one 
                                                 
4  The answers do not add up to 60, since it was possible to combine answers. All CSOs that we interviewed an-
swered this question. 
5  The answers do not add up to 60, since the combination of several answers was possible and only 44 CSOs out of 
60 answered to this question. Among the 16 CSOs that did not give an answer most indicated that they did not 
have members and that therefore the question was not applicable.  
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hand, and the national member organisations that are involved in advocacy or service 
provision in their respective countries on the other. Although many CSOs assign very 
active roles to members, this is not universally the case. Our interviewee from the Crisis 
Management Initiative described their function in rather passive terms: “Obviously they 
get the annual report, but they also get invited to the annual meeting”.  
To summarise, our interviews revealed that most CSOs have individuals that they 
would perceive as their societal constituency. Very few are consciously and openly de-
tached from such a basis. CSO members are involved in many different types of activi-
ties: they contribute to policy development as well as implementation, fundraising, and 
evaluation. However, the degree to which the CSOs’ members are involved in the or-
ganisations seems to vary enormously.  
5 PARTICIPATION 
As highlighted above, the presumption of our research, with regard to the criterion of 
participation, is that the CSO offices should reach out to their members, supporters, and 
beneficiaries. We therefore focused on the communicative process between CSO staff 
and their constituency, in particular between the international advocacy office of CSOs 
and their members6. We concentrated on the ways in which the CSOs consult and coop-
erate with their members and how the members can participate in the CSOs’ decision-
making and political activities, considering both formal and informal means of consulta-
tion and communication, in addition to conflict resolution mechanisms.  
How often do CSO officers personally get in touch with their members? Most inter-
viewees reported rather frequent interaction. 17 officers responded that they had daily 
contact with CSO members, six indicated that they had weekly contact, and 13 indicated 
that these contacts take place regularly/often. Only seven responded that they had 
monthly contact and four indicated that these contacts were rare7. However, many CSO 
officers said that the frequency of member interaction depended upon the demand for it 
from members. This was highlighted by the interviewee from ITUC who said that “it 
depends. There are some who contact me on a weekly basis, and there are others who 
                                                 
6  The distinction between members and supporters could not always be made clearly in the empirical cases. Some 
CSOs referred in their answers to their ‘members’, although we would qualify these persons as ‘supporters’, and 
the CSOs are also sometimes inconsistent with regard to how they classify these individuals.  
7  Most of the 11 CSOs that did not answer  this question said they did not have members in this sense. Eight CSOs 
responded in an ambiguous way. Several CSOs combined different answers, saying, for example that with some 
individual members they had daily contact, while with others this contact only rarely took place. Hence, again, 
the answers do not add up to 60. 
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contact me like once a month and others once a year. So it really differs from one to 
another”. It may also vary among the departments within the CSO.8  
With regard to the means of communication, the CSOs’ staffs reported to be using a 
wide range of communication channels for keeping in contact with their members. 
Many indicated that they communicate through individual letters and emails (36), news-
letters (35), conferences (31), and real-time communication (26). Interactive fora (13), 
the homepage (12), the intranet (12), and hearings (3) were also mentioned9. The CSOs’ 
modes of communication, thus, encompass one-way communication (such as newslet-
ters or the CSO’s Internet homepage) and interactive modes10. Our interviewees largely 
agreed upon the importance of gaining input from their members, despite the large vari-
ety of communication channels between a give CSO’s staff and its members.11.  
Our interviewees particularly highlighted their members’ importance with regard to 
the CSOs’ strategic decision-making. While many CSO officers answered that the stra-
tegic decisions were made by the CSO’s board (37 chose this answer), approximately 
the same number answered that these decisions were made by their members, either at 
the annual member conferences (28 answers) 12, by member surveys and discussions (8 
answers), or in committees composed of members or member representatives (4 an-
swers). Thus, most often, CSOs indicated that their strategic decisions were made by the 
board and/or by their members, most frequently at the annual member conferences. 
Twenty-one CSOs responded that their strategic decisions were made by the 
board/executive or steering committee and by their member conferences/member dis-
cussions. Many CSOs have highly formalised and elaborate structures of member par-
                                                 
8  According to the interviewee from CCME, the frequency does not depend on the size of the member organisation: 
“Small organisations are often better at processing information, depends more on how compatible the EU and na-
tional policy is. This is very important” (Interviewee from CCME). 
9  Combinations of answers were possible. Fourteen CSOs did not answer the question. 
10  However, as the interviewee from Birdlife indicated, “The communication channels that are used most often are 
not always the most important ones. Individual emails and email-lists are very frequent means of communication, 
but personal meetings are also very important. They are more difficult to organise and more expensive, but the 
personal contact at these meetings is very important (translation by authors)”. 
11  In this context, the interviewee from Solidar stated that “[…] we are a member driven organisation, so we exist at 
the will of our members, if you like. They pay affiliation fees in order to have their interests represented collec-
tively. So we need to make sure that our work is being led by their priorities.” 
12  Two CSOs (ESF and Christian Aid) mentioned that their member conferences took place more often than once a 
year, one CSO mentioned that its member conference only took place every 3-4 years (CONGO), and one CSO 
(Pax Christi) highlighted that its strategic decisions were taken at the annual conference and at their tri-annual 
world assembly composed of all members.   
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ticipation in decision making. In some CSOs, the board is composed of member repre-
sentatives (for example, the presidents of the member organisations) or its composition 
is approved at a member conference, and annual member conferences are comple-
mented by meetings of members that take place more often, such as continental and 
regional consultations (for example, Pax Christi) or specific committees (for example, 
Solidar). In other CSOs, the member conferences adopt long-term strategic action plans 
for the organisation: for example, at Action Aid, where a “massive participatory exer-
cise” (Interviewee from Action Aid) took place to decide upon the 5 years guideline. 
This may also serve as a means to inform the members about the past and current work 
of the organisations (as our interviewee from PICUM pointed out).  
Particularly in those CSOs that contain organisations as members (umbrellas) the de-
cision-making procedures are highly institutionalised and member organisations are 
involved through specific, formal procedures in the strategic decision-making. While 
umbrellas often involve their member organisations in the strategic decision-making, 
there are other organisations in which these decisions are made by the management 
board (for example at Saferworld) or, even, by a single CSO officer, who answered our 
question on where the strategic decisions were made: “That would be basically me, un-
derstanding GLOCOM’s mission which is the promotion of the Internet and various 
Internet principles” (Interviewee from GLOCOM). In total, 10 CSOs answered that the 
strategic decisions were made by the advocacy office and 18 referred to different per-
sons and departments within the CSO, among them to CSO staff and management (9 
answers)13.  
In contrast, with regard to the tactical, day-to-day decisions, most of our CSO staff 
interviewees answered that these were made by the advocacy office (38 CSOs chose 
this option). Only eight indicated that these were made by the board, and six referred to 
member surveys and discussions; one officer indicated that, in addition, such decisions 
were made at regular meetings of members14. Twelve CSO officers referred to different 
persons and departments within the CSOs, five interviewees said that these decisions 
were taken in specific working groups and committees, and eight referred to individuals 
in the CSO management, including the executive directors15. Some of our interviewees 
explicitly differentiated between the decisions depending on their importance and on 
                                                 
13  Again, these answers do not add up to 60, since the combination of answers was possible and 3 CSOs did not 
answer this question. 
14  One officer claimed that these decisions were taken at the annual member conferences which seems, however, 
difficult to be implemented in practice. 
15  Again, these answers do not add up to 60 since the combination of different answers was possible and 4 CSOs did 
not answer to this question. 
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whether they concerned urgent matters. While budgetary questions, for example, are 
decided by the member conferences, other issues are decided upon by the Executive 
Committee or groups of members (Interviewee from Bankwatch). As our interviewee 
from Birdlife pointed out, day-to-day decisions that need to be decided quickly can be 
handled by the secretariat alone, as long as they do not contradict the general strategies 
set forth in the position papers that are agreed upon by the members.  
It becomes visible that most CSOs have a certain task-sharing between those at 
member conferences and the board, which are responsible for the strategic decision-
making on the one hand, and the advocacy offices, or other staff and management, 
which make the day-to-day tactical decisions on the other. Specific mechanisms, such as 
working plans that are agreed upon by members or the board and which serve as guide-
lines for the daily work of the organisation, ensure that the different bodies within the 
CSO act in accordance with each other and with the general goals of the organisation. 
The board is, however, sometimes additionally involved at the level of the tactical deci-
sions; while some CSOs indicated that they try to also involve their members at this 
level of decision-making, mainly through ad hoc surveys and discussion.  
When asking CSO representatives about the motivation for this rather frequent inter-
action with their members, the answers (multiple answers possible) mentioned most 
often were:  
(1) to inform the members about the work of the organisation (36); 
(2) to receive the members’ input in policy-making (31); 
(3) to mobilise members for advocacy at national and other levels (30); 
(4) to convince members that the IO is important (18); 
(5) to base policy advice on public support (18).16  
The answers show that the interaction between the IO-level of a CSO and its members 
is a two-way process, that is, informing members about the activities of the IO-level 
office is as important as receiving member feedback for policy-making. The top-down 
dimension of communication is illustrated by the attempt to mobilise members for ad-
vocacy at other levels and also ranks very high among the motivations for member in-
teraction. In general, the answers reveal a rather strong position of many IO-level of-
fices vis-à-vis the rest of the organisation. These offices definitely are not just service-
providers, instrumental in channelling member concerns and interests to the IO. Instead, 
it is also their role to provide leadership, initiate policies, and encourage member en-
gagement at levels other than the IO level.  
                                                 
16  Nine CSOs mentioned other motivations for member interaction than those listed and 15 CSOs did not answer the 
question, 11 of them because they had no members. 
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Asked about a possible trade-off between organisational effectiveness and member 
access to the CSO, nine organisations confirmed that such situations occurred while 34 
CSOs denied it.17 What is noteworthy is that those CSO representatives who perceived 
the trade-off and those who did not often described the same situation in the interview, 
but seemed to draw different conclusions from it. Many interviewees said that slow re-
sponses from members were occasionally a problem in their advocacy work. While 
some concluded that this was a real obstacle to working efficiently, others found that the 
communication with their members increased the quality of their work regardless. One 
CSO representative said: “The more you consult, the less efficient you are, it is inevita-
ble […].” (Interviewee at ECAS). Another explained:  
Sometimes you might have the situation that you need to react very quickly and 
you need input which is not coming on time […] But in general I rather see [it] 
positive than a trade-off from this, because with my work I do on the EU level I 
am effective and I am listened to because I bring specific examples and […] the 
officials hear something they do not hear from the governments. And that makes 
my position stronger. If I tried to do that based only on my knowledge which I 
have being in Brussels, I would never be able to get the same results. (Inter-
viewee at Bankwatch)  
Thus, what often differs is not the situation itself but the way it is perceived and handled 
by CSO staff.18  
A large number of CSO representatives (29 out of 60) declared that they were gener-
ally satisfied with the communication with their members.19 Ten organisations replied 
that they are not satisfied, the most prominent concern being insufficient feedback from 
members: “I think it [the communication with members] could be a lot better because 
we send out a lot of information and don’t necessarily receive the feedback that we’re 
looking for.” (Interviewee at Solidar) Many of those who claim to be generally satisfied 
also expressed this worry: “If it was up to me, I would want more, but for what I think is 
realistic I am satisfied.” (Interviewee at BUND, translation by authors) One CSO repre-
sentative explained that he did not expect members to contribute very much due to the 
complexity of the issues he dealt with and which are largely unknown to them. (Ger-
                                                 
17  17 CSOs did not provide an answer to the question, 11 of which indicated that they had no members. 
18  Some CSOs indicate that they have successfully overcome the trade-off between effectiveness and member ac-
cess through the introduction of clear consultation procedures (e.g. setting deadlines, establishment of specific 
bodies responsible for taking short-term decisions) that all members have agreed to. WIDE has employed an offi-
cer who is in charge of the communication with members. 
19  Six CSOs provided an ambiguous answer and 15 organisations did not reply to the question, nine of 
which indicated that they did not have members. 
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manwatch) Several CSO representatives pointed out that member communication was 
imbalanced, i.e., that some members contributed much more than others. One CSO rep-
resentative stated: “There are always only a few [members] who give feedback and it is 
usually the same ones.” (BUND) and another said: “I have a group of persons […] 
[who] are more active than others and it’s difficult to maintain the momentum with eve-
ryone.” (ESF)  
34 CSOs report that they have experienced situations where members were unhappy 
with the way the organisation was working strategically or tactically (four of which only 
report one single incident). Usually these problems are related to differences of views 
between members that have to be resolved, for example regarding controversial policy 
issues. The interviewee at Amnesty International, for instance, cited abortion and UN 
peacekeeping missions as such controversial issues. The problems may also be related 
to communication and consultation procedures between the IO office and the members, 
for example if the members wish a less diplomatic and stronger wording in lobbying 
documents. 13 CSO representatives claimed to never have encountered conflicts about 
participation within their organisation, but some stressed that they could only speak for 
themselves and that other colleagues might have had different experiences.20 
Seventeen CSOs indicated that they have formal conflict resolution mechanisms in 
place and that designated bodies (e.g., the Steering Committee, the Board or the Secre-
tary General) are entrusted with resolving such disagreements within their organisation. 
Eighteen CSOs have not developed formal mechanisms, but thirteen of them report that 
they resolve such conflicts informally, i.e., through discussions, often on an individual 
basis. Four organisations indicate that they have formal as well as informal conflict 
resolution mechanisms in place.21 Several CSO representatives pointed to the limits 
there are for CSO staff to resolving conflicts between members. The interviewee at 
ECRE said, for example: “[…] we can never make all members happy at once. That’s 
the real challenge of being a European NGO.” Generally the awareness of problems 
related to participation is rather high among CSOs. More than half of the interviewed 
organisations indicate that they have experienced such difficulties. However, roughly 
half of those CSOs that have seen such disagreement have responded with the installa-
tion of formal conflict resolution mechanisms.  
To summarise, while members play a more important role in the formulation of long-
term, strategic decisions of CSOs, the tactical and day-to-day decisions often appear to 
be left completely in the hands of the advocacy office. Some organisations try to limit 
the officers’ discretion by specific safeguard mechanisms, such as long-term work plans 
                                                 
20  Ten CSOs replied that they did not have any members and three organisations did not answer the question.  
21  Ten organisations do not have members and eleven did not provide any answer. 
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that establish a framework for the day-to-day business. In addition, the autonomous role 
of the secretariat in short-term decision-making is, to some extent, mitigated through ad 
hoc consultation via telephone, e-mail, etc. Nevertheless, the IO level office is in a 
rather strong position with regard to the individual members, or member organisations, 
which is also confirmed by the responses related to the motivation for member interac-
tion and the emphasis on members’ importance for the CSO’s advocacy work.  
Not surprisingly, there are important differences between organisations with pre-
dominantly organisational members (umbrellas) and those with individual members. 
Particularly in umbrella organisations, the participation of the member organisations is 
ensured by formalised decision-making procedures. Here the member organisations are 
represented in the member conferences and boards, and in most cases they are involved 
in the making of strategic decisions. However, the degree to which member representa-
tives are involved in the everyday business of an umbrella organisation varies greatly. 
Some CSO officers report being in constant contact with them, while others say that 
they have “rare” contact and ascribe a more passive role to their members as receivers 
of information. The situation is similar in the group of organisations that have an indi-
vidual membership base. Some interact frequently with those members, while others do 
not seem to pay great attention to their views.  
The differences we found regarding the perception of a trade-off between member 
access and efficiency also suggest that the members’ role is different from one CSO to 
another. While the input from their members is regarded as vital by some CSO officers, 
others perceive consultation as a burden. This might be an indicator for different organ-
isational cultures in which members (no matter if organisational or individual) are con-
sidered more or less important. However, members themselves also contribute to these 
differences: not all members are able or willing to make the same contribution in terms 
of policy input to the IO level of the CSO.  
6 INCLUSION 
Against the backdrop of the critical remarks on equality of participation mentioned in 
the previous section and the imbalances within CSOs that are a point of critical concern 
in the current literature (see, for example, Edwards 2000; Hudson 2000; Courville 
2006), we expect from CSOs to undertake empowering activities towards probably dis-
advantaged groups among their members/supporters and beneficiaries22. Empowering 
activities are a precondition for effective participation of disadvantaged groups among 
the CSO’s constituents. In our interviews we asked CSOs representatives whether they 
undertake empowering activities, who they consult regarding policy development and 
                                                 
22  Above, we defined disadvantaged groups and individuals as those coming from disadvantaged regions in the 
world or disadvantaged sectors in society. 
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for whom the CSO claims to speak. Our interviews revealed that many CSOs indeed 
have provisions for empowerment in place. 38 out of 60 CSOs responded positively to 
our question (five answered negatively and three in an indeterminate way)23. However, 
the mechanisms that CSO representatives classify as empowerment encompass a large 
variety of activities. The answer given most often by the CSOs was that they engaged in 
consultation and cooperation with disadvantaged groups and that they asked for their 
input (18 CSOs gave this answer), either directly or via their member organisations. 
Some CSOs, such as PICUM, undertake field visits in order to ensure that the voices of 
those they affect are reflected in their projects and policies, while others say that they 
achieve this by cooperating with local partners (for example, Saferworld).  
Still, our interviewees stressed that they were careful not to engage in paternalistic 
behaviour: “So we are not coming and saying ‘in Africa the people think like that’. 
What we’re saying is you need to consult them and if you want, we can give you the 
names of the partners we have on the ground and we can even invite them to Brussels to 
come and talk to you” (Interviewee from Saferworld). In this context, nine of our selec-
tion of CSOs mentioned that they acted as channels for the voices of disadvantaged per-
sons, for example, by organising roundtables with IO representatives and groups of 
marginalised people (for example, ICTSD) or by providing travel grants to enhance the 
participation of women from developing countries at international venues and CSO 
meetings (for example, WIDE). CSOs act here as facilitators for disadvantaged persons 
by providing them with the means to participate at international political events and, 
thus, giving them the opportunity to raise their own concerns. Eleven CSOs indicated 
that through their general policy they pursued the aim of empowerment, and 9 CSOs 
said that they engaged in capacity building and training, for example through training 
funds (IISD) or other activities. The CSO Asylkoordination, for example, organises 
training for refugee organisations and communities on how to get registered as an or-
ganisation, on how to get funding, etc., at national and EU level. In addition to these 
activities, which may either target the CSO’s members or persons outside the organisa-
tion, the CSOs also undertake activities aiming for empowerment that are focused ex-
clusively on their own members and organisational structure.  
Nine CSOs indicated that wealthier sections within their organisation provide fund-
ing to less affluent ones. Within the Climate Action Network, for example, Northern 
‘regional nodes’ help southern networks to attend negotiations (by paying travel costs) 
and help fund their participation in telephone conferences. Sometimes they even provide 
their Southern counterparts with the means to pay salaries so that their staff can work 
fulltime for the organisation. Other possible instruments include differentially structured 
                                                 
23  14 CSOs did not answer to the question. 
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membership fees for richer and poorer sections within the CSO (this is, for example, set 
in place by Solidar and EPLO). Additionally, some CSOs have specific staffing provi-
sions in place aiming at empowerment (eight CSOs gave this answer): for example, they 
have equal opportunity hiring practices, they particularly promote younger staff, or they 
have specific internship programmes designed for persons coming from developing 
countries (the latter is, for example, the case at the Asian Legal Resource Centre). Gen-
der mainstreaming was mentioned by three CSOs as means for empowerment. Three 
other CSOs mentioned that their boards include members of different constituencies. In 
one example, our interviewee from PICUM reported that one position on the board is 
reserved for a representative of migrants’ organisations, and, in another example, the 
ENAR bylaws postulate that one out of the two board members per country should be 
from an ethnic, religious, or other minority and that gender parity shall be ensured.  
As discussed above in section 4, most CSOs perceive themselves as speaking par-
ticularly for their members. However, they consult with others in addition to their mem-
bers when deciding on strategy and tactics, which is also potentially relevant for inclu-
sion. Our interviewees most often indicated that they consult other international CSOs 
(28 CSOs mentioned this). While some CSOs are part of a more formalised network of 
CSOs who they see as their ‘allies’ (for example, Germanwatch through the Climate 
Action Network), others rely on more informal consultations (for example, IP Justice or 
ATTAC). The interviewee from Greenpeace indicated that they needed information 
from other CSOs due to a lack of resources. Hence, besides strategic advice, CSOs con-
sult with each other in order to obtain expert information. Others, such as FTA, also 
indicated that they contacted other business organisations in order to publish common 
press releases and statements. Another often received answer was that CSOs consult 
with those they affect, local CSOs and stakeholders (this answer was given 16 times). In 
this case as well, more formal and institutionalised consultations with affected popula-
tions can be distinguished from informal ones. In this regard, some CSOs, such as the 
Franciscans International, point to their communications channel with their beneficiar-
ies via their member organisations. Others report that they organise workshops and 
meetings with local activists and beneficiaries, and that they maintain close ties with 
local organisations (i.e., ALRC). Local CSOs are important consultation partners for 
some transnational CSOs (such as for Amnesty International), since they work more 
directly with the persons concerned. While some CSOs, such as SFCG, have established 
procedures for gaining feedback from beneficiaries24 and for feeding their positions into 
                                                 
24  As one interviewee reported: “In Nepal we have a radio programme on youth which is a soap opera. And what we 
then do is we have a listeners group of beneficiaries which is youth from rural areas and we actually have discus-
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their decision-making process, others report that they consult with beneficiaries without 
there being any formal mechanism in place.  
Five CSOs also stated that they consult with IOs, such as FAO, ILO, and UNCTAD 
(IATP) or the EU Commission (FIELD). Additionally, seven said that they consulted 
governments and national delegates. Furthermore, external researchers and experts are 
mentioned as important consultation partners by eight CSOs. Three CSOs indicated that 
they consult with donors25.  
In conclusion, CSOs generally undertake activities that aim at the empowerment of 
disadvantaged persons, both within and beyond their own organisation, staff, members 
and beneficiaries. Some CSOs act as facilitators who make it possible for disadvantaged 
persons to claim their own voice, while most CSOs are careful not to say that they are 
actually speaking for these persons. Rather, they claim to speak for their members. The 
CSO officials that we interviewed were well aware of the reproach of paternalistic be-
haviour towards those they affect. With regard to consultation and policy input, CSOs 
are not only oriented towards their members, but are also particularly oriented towards 
their peers, above all internationally operating NGOs, IOs and national government 
staff. Some CSOs also highlight that they consult with those they affect, but here it is 
useful to distinguish those CSOs that have formal consultation procedures in place from 
some others who simply stated that they would consult with ‘people on the ground’. 
7 TRANSPARENCY 
CSO are not only actors who demand transparency, but ought to be transparent them-
selves. In our view, decision-making processes especially need to be transparent as a 
precondition for successful participation. Having said that, we should stress that most of 
the issues that we address in this section would elsewhere fall under the heading of 
‘CSO accountability’- a term that we do not use here. 
An empirical approach to transparency comprises two dimensions (cf. Grigorescu 
2007: 627): 
 the addressees of transparency, and 
 the extent of transparency. 
The first dimension refers to the group of people who have access to the information 
published. We distinguish between transparency towards the public at large as the 
broadest degree of transparency and inner-organisational transparency, i.e., transparency 
                                                                                                                                               
sions with them, and ask them whether they felt that the discussion in the radio programme was relevant and 
whatever they say is then input immediately in our programme. So there is a continuous cycle…” 
25  The answers do not add up to 60, since the combination of answers was possible and 4 CSOs that we interviewed 
did not answer to the question. 
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towards members. The second dimension of transparency refers to the numerous types 
of information to be made public. A regular transparency-related demand towards IOs 
and CSOs concerns the way in which they reach decisions (Anheier and Themudo 2005: 
195). In addition, the advocacy positions of a CSO should be traceable. A CSO should 
also disclose a certain amount of financial information. Ideally, this would include not 
only the overall size of the budget, but also the percentages that different donors have 
contributed (see section 8 below). When assessing the transparency of CSOs, one 
should also consider whether they have made a conscious commitment to openness and 
accountability. For example, a CSO might choose to sign or impose on itself a code of 
conduct that makes its principles and practices public. Furthermore, CSOs might con-
duct or commission evaluations of their own work, which demonstrates a certain level 
of self-criticism and a commitment to improving their activities.  
The empirical assessment of CSOs is therefore based on interview questions regard-
ing the extent of information published, as well as to whom the information was ad-
dressed. More precisely, CSOs were asked which documents were made public and to 
whom the information was made available (i.e., the public or members). Additionally, 
CSOs were asked whether or not they evaluate their activities and if they have sub-
scribed to a code of conduct. The interviews were complemented with information 
available on CSO websites and in CSO publications, such as annual reports, evalua-
tions, and budget reports. 
CSOs were asked whether they made draft papers, minutes of board meetings, finan-
cial reports, activity reports, and/or evaluation reports available to the public. Five 
CSOs indicated that they publish minutes of Board meetings, ten CSOs distribute draft 
papers, seven organisations make mailing list archives available, 22 CSOs publish activ-
ity reports and seven CSOs make evaluation reports public.26 To be able to judge the 
difference between inner-organisational transparency and transparency towards the lar-
ger public, CSOs were asked whether they provide their members with more informa-
tion than the general public. 39 CSOs confirmed this while only five organisations 
claimed that their members do not receive more information.  
This result is in apparent contradiction with the responses regarding the publication 
of specific documents. In that context, 25 organisations indicated that documents dis-
tributed to their members are also made available to the public. These contradictory 
answers could be interpreted in the way that CSOs believe to be giving more informa-
tion to their members although this is not the case. Also, it might indicate that docu-
                                                 
26  Multiple answers possible. Four CSOs gave an undifferentiated answer (e.g., saying that documents are being 
published but without referring to the specific ones asked for), 13 CSOs did not reply to the question, and eleven 
CSOs indicated that none of the documents inquired about are made available to the public. 
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ments beyond those we inquired about are exchanged between the CSO office and its 
members. Alternatively, and perhaps most plausibly, it could be that the additional in-
formation transmitted to members is shared informally27 and therefore is not mentioned 
when a CSO is asked about specific documents.  
When considering the publication of financial information, the results indicate a 
rather high degree of transparency. 41 out of 60 organisations publish the overall size of 
their budget, while only 12 organisations do not reveal their financial situation. Seven 
organizations, however, chose not to answer this question at all. In several cases, CSO 
representatives claimed during the interview that their budget was available on their 
website or in their annual report, but it was later found that this was not the case. 44 
organisations publish the percentages that specific donors or categories of donors (e.g. 
foundations, international organisations, states) contribute to their budget, while eight 
organisations choose not to publish this information and the remaining eight did not 
provide an answer to this question.28  
It is striking that of the twelve CSOs that do not indicate the overall size of their 
budget, eight are organisations defending special rather than general interests, e.g., trade 
unions or business associations. This corresponds to about 67%, while the overall share 
of special interest organisations in the sample only amounts to approximately 17%. 
Even if our sample is too small for sweeping generalisations, there seems to be a ten-
dency for CSOs defending a general interest to be more transparent about their overall 
budget than organisations defending special interests.  
To the question of whether their organisation possessed a code of conduct, 19 out of 
60 CSOs answered negatively, sometimes adding that they had “nothing in written” 
(HRW and Asylkoordination) but nevertheless had “common standards and values of 
what is acceptable” (Asylkoordination). Only 12 out of 60 CSOs responded positively.29 
Of those 12, eight indicated that they adhere to an inner-organisational code of conduct, 
such as a “Code of Ethics” (WWF) or “Guiding Principles for Conflict Prevention” (In-
ternational Alert). Three CSOs are signatories to the INGO Accountability Charter30. A 
                                                 
27  By informal we mean that the information cannot be traced in written documents. Alternative ways of providing 
members with information might be phone conversations, e-mails, or meetings.  
28  Out of these 44 CSOs, 7 claim that 100% of their budget are made up of membership fees (or 100% private dona-
tions for 1 CSO) but do not indicate the overall size of their budget. Five of these seven CSOs are organisations 
defending special interests. 
29  14 CSOs did not answer the question. 
30  A code of conduct created by CSOs for CSOs which outlines their “common commitment to excellence, trans-
parency, and accountability” (www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org). It has been signed by 16 large transnational 
CSOs as of now. 
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fourth organisation has signed this charter, but the interviewed policy officer was not 
aware of it, in spite of the fact that information about it is available on the CSO’s web-
site. The remaining 15 CSOs adhere to their organisation’s mission statement or staff 
manual, to donor or national regulations for non-profit organisations (e.g., “Belgian 
law” in the case of EuroCommerce or “European Commission regulations” for IHEU), 
or to general philosophical or religious values, such as the “Quakers’ testament” 
(QUNO) or “Franciscan values” (Franciscans). One can safely conclude from these 
answers that formal codes of conduct are still of minor importance to transnational 
CSOs, at least for our sample. Moreover, if they exist, their relevance for any individual 
policy officer appears to be limited.  
With regard to evaluations, we differentiate between internal and external evalua-
tions. Internal evaluations are usually targeted towards advocacy activities, programmes 
and projects, organisational impact, goals achieved etc., and they are designed for inter-
nal use or for reporting to donors. They are typically carried out by the CSO’s staff or 
through member surveys, or by organisational bodies, such as their General Assembly 
or board. Yet SFCG, for example, hires staff specifically to carry out evaluations. Ex-
ternal evaluations are conducted by outsiders, e.g., by hired consultants or peers. They 
often relate to specific programs or projects, but can refer to the work of a CSO in gen-
eral. For example, in the case of Solidar an external consultant was hired during a proc-
ess of strategic planning to overlook and evaluate the organisation’s strategic plan. 
Our results show that a large majority of CSOs, 42 out of 60, evaluate their activities 
only internally. A mere seven organisations commissioned voluntary external evalua-
tions to improve their work and efficiency. It should to be noted that conducting evalua-
tions can only aid transparency if the evaluation reports are made public. Yet, only 
seven organisations indicated that they make evaluation reports available to the general 
public. Four additional organisations provide at least their members with these docu-
ments. Eight CSOs point out that they are required to produce evaluation reports of pro-
jects and/or programs for their donors, thereby increasing their transparency at least for 
their contributors. Notwithstanding the possibility that evaluations as carried out by the 
majority of the CSOs interviewed contribute to improved organisational efficiency, 
these findings are rather unsatisfactory from the point of view of transparency, espe-
cially towards the public at large.  
To sum up, it appears that CSOs are more transparent towards their members than to 
the public at large. It seems, however, that the additional information provided to mem-
bers is of the informal kind, since it cannot be detected when asking about the publica-
tion of specific documents. With regard to financial transparency, most of the CSOs 
interviewed publish their overall budget as well as the percentages contributed by dif-
ferent donors. Among those CSOs who do not reveal their overall budget, the percent-
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age of organisations defending special interests is disproportionally high in comparison 
with the overall sample. Formal codes of conduct are of little apparent importance for 
transnational CSOs. As for evaluations, very few CSOs undergo independent external 
assessments and internal evaluations are rarely published.   
8 INDEPENDENCE 
The criterion of independence aims to assess the degree to which CSOs are autonomous 
from nation states and IOs. It is a necessary precondition for CSOs to fulfil the ‘trans-
mission belt’ function of forwarding citizens’ interests and concerns without being co-
opted by public authorities (Steffek et al. 2010). For the purpose of analysing the inde-
pendence of CSOs, we generally distinguished between two dimensions: financial and 
political independence. Financial independence refers to the question if CSOs or their 
activities are financed from public budgets. If being (co-)funded by either nation states 
or IOs, CSOs might be more susceptible to the political influence of public authorities 
(Hulme and Edwards 1997). Political independence refers to the question if CSOs tend 
to adjust their policies and strategies to governmental requirements. Since time con-
straints prevented us from scrutinizing CSO policies in detail, we approximate the po-
litical independence by evaluating four aspects which indicate a given CSO’s suscepti-
bility to being co-opted: the CSO’s foundation, its staffing, its relationship with the IO 
where it is active, and the strategies it utilises for advocacy.31  
The assessment of the financial independence was based upon official financial re-
ports and was, if necessary, complemented by additional inquiries during our inter-
views. It was measured by the total percentage of public funds as contributions to a 
CSO’s annual budget. We considered funding to be public if it was provided either by 
governments or IOs. 14 organisations refused to provide any information on sources of 
funding. The remaining 46 CSOs are divided as follows: 22 CSOs do not accept public 
funding (10 of which are funded solely by members) while 24 do (table 1). 
Table 1: Sources of Funding  
Publicly Co-funded Privately Funded n/a 
24 2232 14 
 
One interesting point about the 24 CSOs that receive public funding is the relatively 
high percentage of some budgets that is provided by public sources (figure 1). Eight 
                                                 
31  For a more detailed elaboration see Steffek et al. 2009: 18f. 
32  Please note, this information could not be verified by official accounts for all 22 CSOs, because ten organisations 
do not publish financial reports. In these cases, we fully relied on interview statements. 
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CSOs draw from 50% to 90% of their funding from public sources, and the budget of 
five organisations even consists of more than 90% public funds.  
Figure 1: Percentages of Public Funding 
0 2 4 6 8
10-30%
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50-70%
70-90%
> 90%
 
 
Several nation states provide funding for our chosen CSOs, but the percentage shares of 
national governments are in most cases relatively moderate. However, we identified two 
striking exceptions: In 2007, FES received 91% of its funding from different German 
government agencies and EPLO received 50% of its funding from the UK Department 
for International Development. As for IOs, the only large scale funding agency for the 
CSOs in our sample was the EU. Not only did a large number of CSOs receive EU con-
tributions, but even the percentages are remarkably high: in three cases EU funding ex-
ceeds 70% of the CSOs’ total budget (ENAR, HEAL and ECAS).33 
Our assessment of the political independence of our sample of CSOs begins with an 
analysis of their foundation. Ana analysis of the history of our CSOs shows that there 
are three groups of public actors that might provide incentives for the foundation. First, 
the foundation of three organisations was initiated by (former) parliamentarians or poli-
ticians. For example, the Crisis Management Initiative was founded in 2000 by the for-
mer president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari. Second, another two organisations were 
founded with major incentives from national governments. For example, IISD was 
founded in 1990 by a joint initiative of different Canadian governmental agencies.34 
                                                 
33  One of which even reported feeling pressure from its major donor, the European Commission. 
34  The idea for the foundation of IISD arose from the recommendations of a National Task Force on Environment 
and the Economy that was established by the Canadian Council of Ministers on the Environment. The Govern-
ment of Manitoba suggested Winnipeg for its headquarter. Major initial funding was provided by the federal gov-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 113) 
- 27 - 
Third, IOs exert certain influence on the foundation of transnational CSOs by privileg-
ing certain types of organisations and encouraging the creation of new CSOs. The foun-
dation of two CSOs went hand in hand with the history of an IO and both still play a 
privileged role there as ‘social partners’: BusinessEurope was originally founded to 
monitor the European Coal & Steel Community and IOE was founded as a constituent 
part of the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
Although not directly asked about it, three interviewees stated that the emergence of 
umbrella organisations in Brussels is necessitated by the position of the EU to cooperate 
preferably with organisations that represent a unified voice of European civil society.  
When questioned about the recruitment of professional staff, eleven CSOs reported 
that a candidate’s experience with specific IOs was an advantage. In most statements, 
however, it remained unclear if this implies working experience within an IO or experi-
ence with lobbying an IO. Only one interviewee clearly stated that the CSO actively 
recruits former government and IO staff. An analysis of the general relationship they 
have with IOs revealed that 15 out of our chosen 60 CSOs are in a contract with at least 
one IO. Only two of them, however, have contracts with non-EU-institutions.35 The re-
maining 13 organisations have been contracted by the EU for implementing a specific 
project. Additionally, we asked all CSOs for self-assessments that indicated the general 
role of the IO (partner versus counterpart) and the basic working approach. That ap-
proach can be reactive (responding to offers or calls for consultation) or proactive 
(launching own initiatives). Regarding their role vis-à-vis the IO, only four CSOs de-
scribed themselves exclusively as partners (ECAS, CCME, DBV and Oxfam). The ma-
jority of statements were undecided, in the sense that most organisations oscillate be-
tween acting as counterpart and partner of the IO, depending on the policy issue con-
cerned. Similarly, most CSOs (32) were undecided on whether to classify their domi-
nant working approach as either proactive (acting on own initiative) or reactive (re-
sponding to calls from the IO). Only two interviewees stated that their organizations 
acted exclusively reactively (ENAR and FES)36, although four more said that they acted 
predominantly reactively. 14 organisations indicated an almost exclusively proactive 
working approach.  
                                                                                                                                               
ernment (Canadian International Development Agency and Environment Canada) that was reduced to about 22% 
of the total budget (contributions by the federal Government and Governments of provinces) in 2007.  
35  One case is the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), which has temporarily implemented WTO programs for ca-
pacity building in least developed countries through its national offices. The other case is WWF Germany, which 
sometimes takes over lead tasks for projects in the maritime area.  
36  ENAR and FES receive public contributions of 92% and 91%, respectively.   
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With regard to the strategies that are applied by CSOs for influencing policies of IOs, 
we distinguish between cooperative (direct lobbying/direct relations to policy-makers, 
participation in formal consultations), confrontational (public demonstrations, mass pro-
tests, etc.) and neutral (policy papers, press releases) strategies. Two organisations said 
to apply exclusively cooperative strategies: SFCG stated to participate in formal consul-
tations only and DBV stated additionally to lobby directly to policy-makers. Four or-
ganisations apply exclusively neutral strategies. Not a single organisation relied exclu-
sively on confrontational means. The most interviewees (27) stated to use some combi-
nation of cooperative and neutral strategies. 18 organisations said they occasionally also 
resorted to confrontational strategies. Three organisations apply confrontational meas-
ures in addition to neutral strategies while the remaining 15 organisations make use of 
completely mixed strategies, including cooperative, confrontational and neutral means.  
To summarise, the analysis of independence gives certain reason for concern. With 
regard to financing, especially the EU sponsors some CSOs to such an enormous degree 
that doubts about the independence of the organisations arise. The EU also exerts a no-
table influence on the structure of European civil society by fostering collaboration with 
umbrella organisations. Concerning political independence, most CSOs adopted a rather 
cooperative attitude towards IOs, but we would not argue that this finding hints at co-
optation, since willingness to cooperate is essential for successful political advocacy 
and only two organisations apply exclusively cooperative strategies. There is probably 
also a selection bias towards cooperative organisations in our sample because we were 
looking for the most important CSOs, and confrontational organisations tend to remain 
rather on the margins. 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
Most of the CSOs that we interviewed are aware of the importance of their members’ 
participation and of possible problems related to it. However, we observed a difference 
between tactical, day-to-day decisions and long-term strategic decisions. While many 
CSOs invite their members to be involved in  long-term strategic decisions, for daily 
business and tactical issues CSOs rely more on consultation with peers, namely other 
international CSOs, although the international secretariats often act autonomously. Nev-
ertheless, the communication between the CSO offices and their members is dense; 
most organisations interact through various communication channels and communicate 
frequently. Several CSO officers mentioned that they were unsatisfied with the feedback 
they got from their members. Apparently, many CSO’s members are not very eager to 
get involved in the CSO’s decision-making (see also Warleigh 2001: 623) and are in-
stead satisfied with a certain ‘task-sharing’, leaving the daily business to the staff of the 
advocacy offices, which is often more familiar with the institutional setting and deci-
sion-making processes of the international organisations. This also corresponds to the 
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finding that CSOs are undergoing increasing ‘professionalisation’ (see, for example, 
Martens 2005).  
Many of the CSO officers that we interviewed highlighted that they had provisions 
for empowerment in place, which we took as the CSO’s effort to include the persons 
who are affected by or benefit from the CSO’s activities. These provisions either target 
the CSO itself through staffing policies or member empowerment, or they target popula-
tions outside the CSO. While we cannot assess the efficacy of these mechanisms in de-
tail here, their existence documents that transnational CSOs take the problem of uneven 
representation seriously.  
With regard to the criterion of transparency, we observed a difference between CSOs 
that act for general purposes and those that act on behalf of special interests (for exam-
ple, a specific industry). The CSOs that defend a general interest usually are more trans-
parent with regard to their budget than special interest groups. Altogether, external 
evaluations are not very popular among the CSOs that we interviewed; most of them 
evaluate their activities only internally (that is, conducted by members or staff). In this 
context, we also observed that codes of conduct did not play an important role for the 
daily business of the organisations. These findings can be related to the lively debate in 
the literature about CSOs’ accountability, in which frequent calls for codes of conduct 
are made (for example, Bendell 2006). With regard to independence, the difference be-
tween CSOs pursuing a general interest and those pursuing a special interest seem to 
matter yet again. Since CSOs that lobby for a special interest usually dispose of more 
private sector resources than do general purpose groups, they are normally more inde-
pendent from the governmental sector than are the general purpose groups that often 
rely upon such funding. We also observed a certain influence of IOs, particularly of the 
EU, on a CSO’s formation and internal structuring. The European Commission encour-
ages the formation of networks of CSOs and also prefers to work with these networks 
(see Warleigh 2001: 622; for other organisational requirements, namely the group’s 
‘representativeness’, see Greenwood 2010). This is the main reason for the large num-
ber of CSOs belonging to this organisational type within our sample. Despite this influ-
ence of IOs on CSOs’ formation and although many CSOs increasingly pursue coopera-
tive strategies towards IOs, only very few classify themselves solely as partners of the 
IOs and/or governments. Most CSOs insist on their role as a counterweight to other 
groups and to the governmental sector.  
What do the results imply for the democratisation of international governance? Are 
transnational CSOs reaching out to citizens and, in any meaningful sense, representing 
their interest and values, hopes and anxieties? Most CSOs take their members, support-
ers and beneficiaries seriously, as is indicated by the frequent contact the CSOs main-
tain with them. There are, however, tremendous differences between CSOs in how this 
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outreach is organised in practice. Among the transnational CSOs that we considered, we 
found two distinct models of interaction. First, there is the formal and federal method of 
organising outreach that is typical for umbrella organisations. Second, there is the in-
formal and direct participatory method of organising outreach to individuals that is typi-
cally found in expert organisations, but also in some larger organisations that we classi-
fied as membership organisations. 
The formal and federal model typically functions through representative bodies in 
which the organisational and, in some cases, individual members of the umbrella are 
present. The organisational members may be national member organisations, national 
chapters of the same CSO, or autonomous groups that constitute an alliance. In the for-
mal federation, participatory rights are normally explicitly stated and participatory pro-
cedures are very clear. The transnational representative body, whose name varies, is 
central to controlling the executive of the organisation and to providing the input from 
members or member groups. The formal federation thus emulates the model of repre-
sentative democracy that exists in the public realm, and, thus, it should not be surprising 
that the EU encourages the formation of transnational CSOs precisely along these lines.  
From the point of view of democratic theory, this model of outreach has at least one 
clear advantage: it safeguards the rights of all parts of the CSO membership to influence 
the internal policy process of the organisation. On the other hand, such a complex or-
ganisational structure cannot respond quickly and ad hoc to new developments, while it 
must grant substantial leeway to the advocacy office. Furthermore, the chain from the 
decision-making centre to the individual member tends to become long and opaque in 
these umbrellas, in particular when they are embedded in network structures that are on 
the rise in the capitals of transnational governance. From the perspective of an individ-
ual member or supporter, this tends to produce the same ‘remoteness effects’ that multi-
level governance also suffers from in the public domain. In addition, formal, federal 
practices of consultation tend to be inward-looking, in the sense that they privilege for-
mal members over informal supporters and beneficiaries. Exemplifying this, mecha-
nisms of empowerment that formal federations reported were often directed to disad-
vantaged groups among their own members. 
The informal method of organising outreach is definitely typical for small transna-
tional organisations without a federal structure or mass membership. These organisa-
tions typically consult their members and supporters electronically, often asking rather 
specific questions. This is made easier by the fact that most of their members or sup-
porters have considerable expertise in the CSO’s area of specialisation. When citizens 
outside the organisation are contacted under this organisational model, they are com-
monly people affected by their work. Quite obviously, these organisations cannot claim 
to be representative of an impressive number of citizens. But small size may have its 
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advantages: if managed properly, these organisations allow for a high level of direct 
participation and of internal deliberation. If they can remain in close contact with the 
persons affected by the international policies pursued in their field of activity, they add 
a valuable citizen’s perspective to the international political arena.  
In sum, we cannot say a priori that one specific type of transnational CSO, or one 
specific consultation regime, is superior to another in its ability to reach out to citizens 
and gather their concerns. Rather, we should develop standards of participation and em-
powerment that are tailor-made for the respective type of organisation. Participation and 
empowerment should mean different things for different types of organisations. Under 
the formal, federal model of consultation we would expect that procedures of internal 
democracy are consistently applied and that efforts are made to mobilise and support 
disadvantaged groups of members. Under the informal model we would expect organi-
sations to be open to direct participation of their limited number of members and sup-
porters, to enable processes of deliberation by all, and to reach out to those affected by 
their work. Our research showed that there are organisations in both camps that take the 
outreach to their members and beneficiaries very seriously, while others appear some-
what reluctant. Thus, even though we acknowledge that the term ‘outreach to citizens’ 
may mean different things for different types of CSOs, we are still able to critically 
evaluate the performance of individual organisations through this differential approach. 
One example may suffice to illustrate the critical potential inherent in our approach. 
In Brussels we found a small group of three organisations, all located in the field of EU 
foreign relations and security that definitely cannot count as the citizens’ voice in inter-
national politics. They were the only organisations (out of 60) that did not perceive 
themselves as representing or speaking for concrete individuals but on behalf of their 
‘expertise’. None of them have any members beyond a relatively small circle of activists 
and only the representative of one of the three organisations reported to consult occa-
sionally with beneficiaries of their activities. Moreover, two of them were founded by 
ex-government and IO officials. Such expert organisations may be characterised as pro-
fessional think tanks very close to the centres of political decision-making, but defi-
nitely not as an embodiment of citizens’ concerns. We should stress, however, that these 
are outliers and not representative of our sample. Most transnational CSOs have at least 
some grounding in the citizenry and some potential to establish a communicative trans-
mission belt between citizens (understood as their members, supporters and beneficiar-
ies) and IOs.  
One limitation of the research performed so far concerns the umbrella organisations 
that are important civil society players, particularly in Brussels. Within the formal, fed-
eral structure of the umbrella we concentrated on the link between the first and second 
layer of organisation, when counting from the top, but were not able to follow the chain 
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of communication down to the individual member. This research clearly needs to be 
complemented by a systematic analysis of participation and consultation below the sec-
ond layer, taking into account not only formal channels of representation, but also in-
formal avenues for individuals that can bypass one or, even, several layers in this con-
struction. Only then can we pronounce any judgment on the ability of these complex 
multi-level structures of organised civil society to become something like ‘the citizens’ 
voice’. 
REFERENCES 
von Alemann, Ulrich, and Rolf G. Heinze. 1981. Parteien, Staat und Verbände - die aktuelle Diskussion 
um eine Kontrolle der Verbände in der Bundesrepublik. In Verbände und Staat: vom Pluralismus zum 
Korporatismus. Analysen, Positionen, Dokumente, edited by U. v. Alemann and R. G. Heinze. Opla-
den: Westdeutscher Verlag, 115-117. 
Anderson, Kenneth. 2000. The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-
governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society. European Journal of Interna-
tional Law 11 (1):91-120. 
Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor. 2001. Introducing Global Civil Society. In Global 
Civil Society 2001, edited by H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 3-21. 
Anheier, Helmut, and Nuno Themudo. 2005. Governance and Managment of International Membership 
Organisations. Brown Journal of World Affairs 11(2):185-198. 
Arts, Bas. 1998. The Political Influence of Global NGOs. Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity 
Conventions. Utrecht: International Books. 
Bendell, Jem. 2006. Debating NGO Accountability. NGLS Development Dossier. New York/Geneva: 
United Nations. 
Bichsel, Anne. 1996. NGOs as Agents of Public Accountability and Democratization in Intergovernmen-
tal Forums. In Democracy and the Environment. Problems and Prospects, edited by W. Lafferty and 
J. Meadowcraft. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 234-255. 
Bouwen, Pieter. 2002. Corporate Lobbying: the Logic of Access. Journal of European Public Policy 9 
(3):365-390. 
Bovens, Mark. 2007. Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework. European Law 
Journal 13 (4):447–468.  
Courville, Sasha. 2006. Understanding NGO-based Social and Environmental Regulatory Systems: Why 
We Need New Models of Accountability. In Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experi-
ences, edited by M. W. Dowdle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 271-300 
De Schutter, Olivier. 2002. Europe in Search of its Civil Society. European Law Journal 8 (2):198-217. 
Edwards, Michael. 2000. NGO Rights and Responsibilities: A New Deal for Global Governance. London: 
Foreign Policy Centre in Association with NCVO. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 113) 
- 33 - 
Esty, Daniel C. 2002. The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis. World Trade Review 1 (1):7-
22. 
Greenwood, Justin. 2007. Review Article: Organised Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in the EU. 
British Journal of Political Science 37 (2):333-357. 
Greenwood, Justin. 2010: Regulating NGO Participation in the EU; A De-facto Accreditation System 
Built on ‚Representativeness’? In Evaluating Transnational NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Rep-
resentation, edited by J. Steffek, K. Hahn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. 
Grigorescu, Alexandru. 2007. Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Role of Member 
States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations. International Studies Quar-
terly 51 (3):625–648.  
Guo, Chao, and Juliet A. Musso. 2007. Representation in Nonprofit and Voluntary Organizations: A 
Conceptual Framework. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 36 (2):308-326. 
Hirsch, Joachim. 2003. The State’s New Clothes: NGOs and the Internationalization of States. Política y 
Cultura 20:7-25. 
Hudson, Alan. 2000. Making the Connection. Legitimacy Claims, Legitimacy Chains and Northern 
NGOs’ International Advocacy. In New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge 
of Change, edited by T. Wallace, D.J. Lewis. Hartford: Kumarian Press, 89-97. 
Hulme, David, and Michael Edwards, Eds. 1997. NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jensen, Mark N. 2006. Concepts and Conceptions of Civil Society. Journal of Civil Society 2 (1):39-56. 
Jobert, Bruno, and Beate Kohler-Koch, eds. 2008. Changing Images of Civil Society: From Protest to 
Governance. London: Routledge. 
Johns, Gary. 2003. The NGO Challenge. Whose Democracy is it Anyway? Conference paper presented at 
the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., 11 June 2003.  
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in Interna-
tional Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Kohler-Koch, Beate, and Christine Quittkat. 2008. What Is Civil Society and Who Represents Civil Soci-
ety in the EU? Results of an Online Survey among Civil Society Experts. Manuscript, Mannheim Cen-
tre for European Social Research (MZES). 
Martens, Kerstin. 2001. Non-governmental Organisations as Corporatist Mediator? An Analysis of NGOs 
in the UNESCO System. Global Society 15 (4):387-404. 
Martens, Kerstin. 2003. Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law. Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 10 (2):1-24. 
Martens, Kerstin. 2005. NGO's and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and 
Adaptation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Nanz, Patrizia, and Jens Steffek. 2004. Global Governance, Participation, and the Public Sphere. Gov-
ernment and Opposition 39 (2):314-335. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 113) 
- 34 - 
Nanz, Patrizia, and Jens Steffek. 2005. Assessing the Democratic Quality of Deliberation in International 
Governance: Criteria and Research Strategies. Acta Politica 40 (3):368-383. 
Naurin, Daniel. 2002. Taking Transparency Seriously. SEI Working Paper.  
Offe, Claus. 1981. Die Institutionalisierung des Verbandseinflusses - eine ordnungspolitische Zwickmüh-
le. In Verbände und Staat: vom Pluralismus zum Korporatismus. Analysen, Positionen, Dokumente, 
edited by U. v. Alemann and R. G. Heinze. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 72-91. 
Reimann, Kim D. 2006. A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth 
of NGOs. International Studies Quarterly 50 (1):45-67. 
Reinalda, Bob, Bas Arts, and Math Noortmann. 2001. Non-State Actors in International Relations: Do 
They Matter? In Non-State Actors in International Relations, edited by B. Reinalda, B. Arts and M. 
Noortmann. Alsdershot: Ashgate, 1-9. 
Risse, Thomas. 2002. Transnational Actors and World Politics. In Handbook of International Relations, 
edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. London: Sage, 255–274. 
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View on Democracy. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Steffek, Jens, Ralf Bendrath, Simon Dalferth, Kristina Hahn, Martina Piewitt, and Meike Rodekamp. 
2010. Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational CSOs: Five Criteria. In: Evaluating 
Transnational NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation, edited by J. Steffek, K. Hahn, Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. 
Steffek, Jens, and Patrizia Nanz. 2008. Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation in Global and 
European Governance. In Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance. A Cure for 
the Democratic Deficit? edited by J. Steffek, C. Kissling and P. Nanz. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1-29. 
Sudbery, Imogen. 2003. Bridging the Legitimacy Gap in the EU: Can Civil Society Help to Bring the 
Union Closer to Its Citizens? Collegium 26:75-95. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Trachtman, Joel P., and Philip M. Moremen. 2003. Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO 
Dispute Settlement. Whose Right Is It Anyway? Harvard International Law Journal 44 (1):221-250. 
Warleigh, Alex. 2001. ‚Europeanizing’ Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialization. Journal 
of Common Market Studies 39 (4):619-139. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 113) 
- 35 - 
ANNEX: LIST OF ORGANSIATIONS UNDER STUDY 
(n.b. ‘policy field’ refers to the context in which an organisation was interviewed, which 
is not necessarily its only field of activity) 
 
Acronym Full Name Policy Field 
ActionAid Action Aid Trade 
AHRC 
Asian Legal Resource Center/Asian Human Rights 
Commission 
Human rights 
AIEU Amnesty International EU Office Human rights 
Alliance Sud Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations Trade 
Amnesty Int. Amnesty International Human rights 
Asylkoordination Asylkoordination Österreich  Human rights 
ATTAC CH 
Vereinigung für eine Besteuerung  
von Finanztransaktionen zum Nutzen der Bürger 
Trade 
Bankwatch The CEE Bankwatch Network Environment 
BirdLife Int. BirdLife International Environment 
BUND 
Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz  
Deutschland e.V. 
Environment 
BUSINESSEUROPE The Confederation of the European Business Trade 
CAN Climate Action Network International Environment 
CCME Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe Human rights 
Christian Aid Christian Aid Trade 
CMI Crisis Management Initiative Peace 
Congo 
The Conference of Non-Governmental Organisa-
tions in Consultative Relationship with the United 
Nations 
Human rights 
DBV Deutscher Bauernverband Trade 
ECAS European Citizen Action Service Environment 
ECRE European Council on Refugees and Exiles Human rights 
ENAR European Network Against Racism Human rights 
EPLO The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office Peace 
ESF The European Services Forum Trade 
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Acronym Full Name Policy Field 
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation Trade 
EuroCommerce Association of Commerce of the European Union Trade 
FES Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung Trade 
FIELD 
Foundation for International Law and  
Development 
Environment 
FoE Europe Friends of the Earth Europe Trade 
Franciscans Int. Franciscans International Human rights 
FTA The Foreign Trade Association Trade 
Germanwatch Germanwatch Nord-Süd-Initiative e.V. Environment 
Glocom Global Communications Platform Human rights 
Greenpeace Dt. Greenpeace e.V. Deutschland Trade 
Greenpeace Int. Greenpeace International Trade 
HEA Health & Environment Alliance Environment 
HRW Human Rights Watch Human rights 
IATP Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy  Trade 
ICC Dt. Internationale Handelskammer Trade 
ICC Int. International Chamber of Commerce Trade 
ICTSD 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development 
Trade 
IHEU International Humanist and Ethical Union Human rights 
IISD 
International Institute for Sustainable  
Development 
Trade 
International Alert International Alert Peace 
International  
Crisis Group 
The International Crisis Group Peace 
IOE  International Organisation of Employers Trade 
IP Justice IP Justice Human rights 
ISIS Europe International Security Information Service, Europe Peace 
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation Trade 
Oxfam Int.  Oxfam International Trade 
Parität Der Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband  Human rights 
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Acronym Full Name Policy Field 
Pax Christi Pax Christi e.V. Peace 
PICUM 
The Platform for International Cooperation on 
Undocumented Migrants 
Human rights 
QCEA The Quaker Council for European Affairs Peace 
QUNO  The Quaker United Nations Office Trade 
Saferworld Saferworld Peace 
SFCG Search for Common Ground Peace 
Solidar SOLIDAR Trade 
UN Watch UN Watch Human rights 
WIDE Women in Development Europe Trade 
WWF Dt. World Wide Fund For Nature, Deutschland Environment 
WWF Int. World Wide Fund For Nature, International Trade 
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